The 20-year review of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) presented a significant opportunity for South Africa to reclaim the leadership role in United Nations (UN) digital development negotiations it played during the Geneva and Tunis phases. It was also an opportunity to demonstrate the government’s commitment to rights-respecting digital development and multistakeholder collaboration at home.
This was demonstrated during the December 2025 High-Level Event. Members of the delegation were led by Minister of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT) Solly Malatsi, who spoke at the opening of UN General Assembly (UNGA) proceedings. They participated in several side events, providing strong inputs on key WSIS concerns such as financing. South Africa was also a co-organiser of a successful side event, Quantum Computing: Capacity Training for UN diplomats and International Policymakers.
DCDT Director-General Nonkqubela Jordan-Dyani and Cynthia Lesufi, Chair of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Council Working Group on WSIS, contributed actively to Digital@UNGA, consistently affirming the importance of continuing the WSIS process as the UN’S central platform for digital development and cooperation. They expressed support for the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) securing a long-term mandate, joining a call from several Global South states for more intentional participation by governments in the IGF. They also called for greater recognition of the role of the WSIS Forum in follow-up and implementation, and continued to support the integration of WSIS and the Global Digital Compact (GDC).
The WSIS +20 Outcome Document is strong in relevant text on digital development and human rights but lacks actionable implementation steps, particularly for states. While most of South Africa’s concerns are mentioned in the outcome document, it left several key national and Global South ambitions unmet. These are further explored below.
A year of active positioning and leadership
Throughout the 2024-2025 review cycle, South Africa sought a central role. It actively bid to be a co-facilitator of the overall process and, while unsuccessful, secured a key position by chairing the High-Level Event in July 2025. This engagement built on earlier prominence, such as during the September 2024 GDC negotiations, where South Africa played a crucial diplomatic role in securing African support for the Compact.
At the national level, the government demonstrated serious commitment. It conducted extensive consultations, produced a national report, participated in civil society-led multistakeholder engagements, and used platforms like the South African Internet Governance Forum (ZAIGF) to gather multistakeholder input.
The Shadow of the G20: A drain on capacity
Despite this strong positioning, South Africa’s ability to consistently influence the nitty-gritty of the WSIS+20 outcome document negotiations was significantly hampered by a concurrent, massive responsibility: its 2025 G20 Presidency. The immense energy, time, and diplomatic capital required for the G20 left the delegation stretched thin. By the time the “zero draft” of the WSIS document was published, South Africa was too deeply engaged with G20 priorities to make substantive textual inputs. Not for the first time, the South African government’s lack of management and coordination capacity increased stress and limited impact. For example, with a bit more effort and interdepartmental communication – between the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, the Department of Science and Innovation and the DCDT – the government could have complemented its capacity through ensuring more consistent and structured participation of individuals from civil society and the technical and academic communities in the process of contributing to and negotiating the final outcome. This would have built on its stated support for the multistakeholder approach.
Priorities articulated, priorities sidelined
Minister Malatsi summarised South Africa’s position during his speech to the UNGA, partially reposted on LinkedIn during the High-Level Event. It highlighted that: “WSIS must remain the primary, UN-anchored implementation framework for a people-centred digital future that respects human rights, even as the digital future evolves to respond to new realities such as artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies.” He also highlighted the need for coordination between the WSIS+20 process and the GDC to avoid duplication.
Specific priorities reiterated by government representatives throughout the process were:
1. Financing for development: Arguing for concrete mechanisms to fund digital infrastructure and capacity building in the Global South.
2. Multi-stakeholder and “enhanced co-operation”: Supporting the multistakeholder approach while advocating for a strengthened role for governments, particularly within the IGF.
3. Addressing digital inequality: Using WSIS as a platform to centre equitable digital development, especially for women, youth, persons with disabilities, and people in the Global South.
4. Human rights online, framed by sovereignty and development: Support for the protection of human rights online as per international law, often referencing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in line with Western nations. Representatives emphasised a balanced approach, integrating rights with the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference. Their interventions often focused on developmental rights (the right to development, access to information for empowerment) and highlighted the dangers of digital colonialism, data exploitation, and unilateral coercive measures (sanctions) that deny populations access to technology.
In the final analysis, these priorities found only partial or disappointing reflection in the outcome document. Financing was largely sidelined, delegated to an ITU-led task force (in their capacity as Secretariat of the UN Group on the Information Society) rather than being a core pillar and led by an empowered multistakeholder process. While digital inequality was mentioned, the document also included contested language on internet penetration that many felt was misleading. Global North governments appeared to be driven by a fear that any serious discussion of financing would result in new demands for aid. Many of these states have existing initiatives to finance digital development, e.g. through initiatives like the European Union’s Global Gateway. This misses the point that development cooperation has changed fundamentally in the last 20 years. More importantly, it fails to acknowledge that approaches to financing WSIS implementation since 2005, shaped by the assumption that “the private sector will take care of it”, have failed to reverse digital inequality. This failure represents a missed opportunity for WSIS spearheading collaborative and innovative approaches to investing in digital justice and development.
Perhaps the most symbolic disappointment for South Africa was the treatment of the IGF. South Africa, aligning with the G77, saw an opportunity to creatively strengthen the IGF as a platform for more effective governmental engagement –an alternative to reopening historically deadlocked debates. They wanted an IGF that is more responsive to the needs of developing nations and advocated that its outcomes should be better linked to formal UN decision-making processes. This was based on support for an approach to multistakeholderism whereby non-governmental stakeholders work in consultation with governments, especially on issues of public policy, security, and rights, but without replacing intergovernmental authority.
This vision was met with what was perceived as a lack of openness and diplomacy from Global North countries, resulting in an outcome text with little substantive action on strengthening government engagement in the IGF. However, Global South countries themselves, including South Africa, also engaged in a way which made progress difficult. When you have less power and influence you can simply not afford inadequate preparation. G77 inputs were consistently late throughout the process of finalising the outcome document. Nor did they make serious efforts to work inclusively with civil society and other non-state actors. While they are internally divided on many issues such as human rights and gender equality – issues that might have been difficult to resolve given the divergence in views – more intentional preparation and collaboration across stakeholder groups on a few key issues could have produced better outcomes.
A bittersweet outcome and a fragile process
Ultimately, South Africa strongly supports the final WSIS+20 document, while aligning with the G77’s concluding statement that expressed concern over the process and its outcomes.
However, the process revealed a deeper, more troubling fragility. At a time when the international rules-based order is in flux, WSIS+20 presented a unique opportunity to elevate the universally endorsed, people-centred development goals of the original summit above geopolitics. Instead, traditional divides reasserted themselves and Global North states appeared to be unwilling to engage actively in exploring new ways of concrete, creative, development-oriented collaboration. National and regional IGFs originally served as platforms for multistakeholder dialogues and the implementation of multistakeholder initiatives. Therefore, a stronger participation in these forums by the South African government is crucial for the effectiveness of WSIS both nationally and globally.
The value of the WSIS+20 outcome will now depend entirely on its implementation. For South Africa, the WSIS process remains vital, as does its linkage to other critical digital debates including the GDC, and those on AI governance, data, and trade. The summit may have closed with unmet ambitions, but the larger project of striving for an equitable digital future continues. If South Africa wants to maintain and strengthen its voice at the table it needs to get its house in better order, e.g. in how it operationalises the multistakeholder approach. It also needs to be more creative in how it plays a leadership role as a democratic state which is deeply committed to human rights as well as more just and equitable global digital development and governance.
Side events involving South Africa
- Financing digital innovation ecosystems in the majority world: Challenges & Opportunities. Organisers: Global Digital Justice Forum, IT for Change, Association for Progressive Communications. Speaker: Nonkqubela Jordan-Dyani, Director-General, Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT).
- Digital@UNGA WSIS+20 Edition. Organisers: ITU, UN Development Programme (UNDP). Speakers: Solly Malatsi, Minister of Communications and Digital Technologies.
- Quantum Computing: Capacity Training for UN diplomats and International Policymakers. Organisers: Microsoft, South Africa. Speakers: Solly Malatsi.
- Celebrating Twenty Years and Achieving Future Milestones Together. Organisers: ITU, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNDP, Switzerland. Speakers: Cynthia Lesufi, Minister Counsellor , DCDT and Nonkqubela Jordan-Dyani.
